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ABSTRACT 
This paper shows a vulnerability of the pay-per-click accounting of Google Ads and proposes a statistical 
tradeoff-based approach to manage this vulnerability. The result of this paper is a model to calculate the 
overhead cost per click necessary to protect the subscribers and a simple algorithm to implement this 
protection. Simulations validate the correctness of the model and the economical applicability.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The pay-per-click accounting method adopted by Google Ads service for online advertising 
services [1][2] enables the Advertising Provider (AdP, e.g., Google) to automatically charge the 
Advertised Subscribers (AdS) for each single advertised page access (called “click”) requested 
by each web user. Differently from previous online pay-per-click methods, this method does not 
need AdP and AdS to agree on respective web access logs and “referrer headers” [3], as a 
consequence the cost of subscriber’s signup and charging processes are extremely reduced. This 
method allows a single AdP to manage millions pay-per-click contracts, thus making the pay-per-
click advertising a mass service, as it appears today. 
 
Figure 1 - Google Ads Revenue [10] 
 Being the click count the key figure upon which such a mass business calculates billion dollars 
revenue (see Figure 1), the paper presents a contribution to the relevant topic of evaluating the 
reliability of such a figure. In particular, the paper focuses on the robustness against malicious 
web clients who might spam the click counts, typically to make the click count rapidly exhaust 
the daily budget, thus eliminating AdS competitors from the advertising network within the first 
hours of each accounted day [4]     
While big effort has been spent to setup heuristics to detect distributed click spam [5] [6][7] [8], 
we show in this paper that even a centralized attack works. In particular we shows how a simple 
malicious web user agent, using one IP address only, can make the click count increase for a given 
AdS, even if the charged clicks do not correspond to any real advertisement (Section 2).  
To protect the AdS from this type of attack, we present a detailed statistical model of the trade-
off between the security benefits obtained and the revenue losses caused by discarding potentially 
spammed clicks (Section 3).  
Upon this model, we formulate a simple algorithm to control the trade-off (Section 4) and we 
validate it through simulation (Section 5).  
Some remarks on applications and future work conclude the paper (Section 6). 
 
 
 
2. ATTACK 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
The attack presented in this paper, as depicted in Figure 2, is directed to the “fairness principle” 
of the AdP who charges one click only to the AdS, even when one user agent accesses the same 
advertised web page more than once. This principle considers that only the first click corresponds 
to a real advertisement, whilst the other repeated clicks do not provide any benefit in terms of 
advertised contents.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Attack method 
 
 The vulnerability to this attack depends on the fact that no deterministic and secure rules to 
implement this principle are applicable on the AdP server side, to determine whether two clicks 
are originated by the same user agent or not.  
According to the experiments done, the approach followed by Google algorithm adopts the 
heuristic to consider n clicks as originated by the same user agents according two conditions 
(a) if the user agent “cookie” header values is the same in the n HTTP requests corresponding 
to the n clicks OR  
(b) if the n clicks are originated by the same IP address and also n DNS queries are originated 
from the same IP address to resolve the AP Server name, just before each of the n HTTP 
request corresponding to the clicks 
otherwise the n clicks are both accounted, as if they were originated by two different user agents. 
Consequently, the attack works as follows. A malicious HTTP client, whose pseudocode is 
available in Figure 3, performs many HTTP requests to the same link advertised by the AdP 
server, simply resetting both the cookie header value and the client’s system DNS cache before 
sending each HTTP request. The client sends the request from the same source IP address.  
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the clicks accounted shown by Google Ads dashboard, before and 
after our experiments, respectively. 
Figure 3 Malicious HTTP client pseudocode. 
 
 
Figure 4. Google AdWords daily accounted clicks before the attack 
HTTP_header  = “ 
  Host: // is set accordingly to the HTTP server name 
  Accept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 
Accept-Language: it-IT,it;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4,es;q=0.2,pl;q=0.2 
Connection: keep-alive 
User-Agent: //is set with a random choice of user-agent 
Accept-Encoding: */* “ 
 
repeat N times  
clean_DNS_cache();  
HTTP_Send (“GET www.google.it/search?q=<QUERY> HTTP/1.1" + HTTP_Header);//No Cookies 
HTTP_Response = HTTP_receive() 
Response_body = HTTP_parse(ENTITY_BODY, HTTP_Response) 
Target_link = search(TARGET, Response_body) // Attack Target 
MyCookie = http_parse(COOKIES, HTTP_Response) 
HTTP_send ("GET target_link HTTP/1.1" + HTTP_Header + "Cookie = MyCookie") 
HTTP_Response = HTTP_receive() 
Status_Code = http_parse(STATUS_CODE,HTTP_Response) 
while (Status_Code == 300) // Redirect 
 Location = http_parse (LOCATION,HTTP_Response) 
HTTP_Send "GET Location HTTP/1.1" + HTTP_Header + "Cookie = MyCookie"  
Extract Status_Code from HTTP_Response 
end while  
end repeat 
 
 Figure 5. Google AdWords daily accounted clicks after the attack 
 
In case of this sample attack, the AdP has detected only about 50% of false clicks, while the others 
are normally accounted, as shown in Figure 3. 
The reader could wonder why Google heuristic does not consider the IP address as a safe 
information to determine that two clicks originate from the same user agent. The answer is that 
most IP networks over the Internet are IPV4 network adopting the Network Address Translation 
(NAT) [9], so that, potentially, two or even more hosts, each running a different user agent, can 
send distinct HTTP requests from the same IP address to the same AdP server. The AdP server 
might see, in that case, different clicks of really different users coming from the same IP address, 
as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 – Problems in IP address-based attack discrimination in NAT networks  
 
We observe that disregarding the source IP address is a clearly safe heuristic for the AdP, 
unfortunately it is unsecure for the AdS as our experiments put in evidence. 
Our investigation bases on the probability, for each NAT network, that two independent clicks, 
although coming from the same IP address, originate from two or more distinct user agents. This 
probability will drive the algorithm to decide whether counting such clicks or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 RESULTS 
 
Table 1. Attack result table 
 After attack (started at 12.00 am) End of the day 
Date 
Simulated 
click 
Counted 
click 
Discarded 
 click 
Counted 
click 
Discarded 
click Cost 
13/01/18 10 10 4 14 5 2,66* 
14/01/18 10 8 2 14 4 1,71 
15/01/18 15 12 3 12 21 1,01 
17/01/18 20 10 12 29 17 2,98* 
*THE DAILY BUDGET HAS BEEN EXCEEDED 
 
Table 1 shows the results of the most recent experimental test performed just before the 
submission of this paper. 
 
Every attack started at 12.00 a.m. when the click accounting resets. Between consecutive clicks 
the client waits a variable random time interval of 20 minutes average, as we noticed that more 
frequent or regular time intervals often reduce the attack efficiency. 
 
The click counters figures have been extracted by report of the Google Ads dashboard one hour 
after the end of the attack execution, i.e., after Google’s heuristics has discarded possible 
spammed clicks. The results show that the impact of spamming for the attacked AdS is huge, 
compared with the click counted at the end of the day reported in the right section of Table 1. 
 
When the click accounting approaches the daily budget, Google AdWords stops advertising the 
contents, as in the cases reported in first and last table rows, so that the competitors of the attacked 
AdS can be strongly motivated in this type of attacks to increase their own visibility.    
 
 
3. TRADE-OFF MODEL  
The model analyzes the clicks coming from a NAT address space using the following variables 
● a time interval T, called statistics window, within which two clicks are counted only once 
if they are activated by the same user and have the same target. If the time distance 
between two following clicks is more than time T they are counted twice although 
directed by the same user to the same advertised resource. 
● an integer number A, corresponding to the cardinality of the NAT address pool.  
● an integer number C corresponding to the number of clicks coming from any address in 
the NAT pool and directed to the same AS resource 
 
 The average number N(A,C) of “repeated clicks”, i.e., the clicks directed to the same resource 
and coming from the same IP address but from different users over a NAT pool having cardinality 
A, provided that C clicks in total are coming from that NAT pool. 
 
The case of “no malicious users involved” corresponds to supposing that each user performs only 
one click, so that repeated clicks are originated by two different users using the same IP address. 
 We define loss factor  
 
L(A,C)  = N(A,C) x A / C 
 
as the average percentage of real clicks that are potentially lost (i.e. not accounted) if all repeated 
clicks (2,3,4...), coming from the same address are systematically ignored. The average number 
of clicks N exceeding the single click is multiplied by the number A of addresses available, to 
obtain the average click over all the NATted network, and is divided by C to calculate the 
percentage over all clicks.   This percentage corresponds to the loss rate of revenue that is paid by 
the AdP to protect the AdS. 
 
If L is below a fixed threshold e.g. 1% , the heuristic decides to ignore all repeated click. 
 
To calculate N(A,C) we consider the clicks as uniformly random independent events falling in a 
1-d continuous space that splits into A equal segments, each representing the subspace of 
probability that a click is originated by the address represented by that segment, as shown in 
Figure 7. We assume that there is no correlation between IP address and user interest for a specific 
content, as there is no reason to suppose any correlation.  This corresponds a Poisson Distribution 
where λ = C/A.  
 
 
Figure 7 –Scheme of the Poisson process mapped to the click spam model 
 
Considering that the average number of repeated events falling in the same interval is  
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Then 
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And consequently 
 
𝐿(𝐴, 𝐶)  = 𝑁(𝐴, 𝐶) ⋅
𝐴
𝐶
  
 
As shown in the Appendix, it is worth noticing that if A >> C then  
𝑁(𝐴, 𝐶)  <  
1
2
 𝐶2/𝐴2 
 
As a consequence 
 
𝐿(𝐴, 𝐶)  <  
1
2
 𝐶/𝐴 
 
This approximation, being a second-order Taylor polynomial approximation, is very precise for 
typical C/A values for large networks, e.g. If C/A =  10−3 then   |𝐿(𝐴, 𝐶)  −  
1
2
 𝐶/𝐴| < 10−6. 
 
4. ALGORITHM 
The proposed algorithm is based on the following entities:  
 
A table, called the status table having the following fields: 
▪ dest : the destination URL of the Click 
▪ source: the source IP address (possibly NATted) 
▪ net: the id of the smallest network range registered in whoid DB 
▪ time:  timestamp  (epoch)  
 
An object, called click, having the properties of each click received, i.e.,   
▪ click.dest : the destination URL of the Click 
▪ click.source: the source IP address (possibly NATted) 
▪ click.time: the click message receiving timestamp (epoch)  
 The actions done after each click is to count the click as valid incrementing the click counter 
through the function increment_counter() or to reject the click through the function “discard”.  
The algorithm discards the clicks as long as the average statistical number of repeated clicks is 
below a threshold.  
 
 
Figure 8. Pseudocode of click selection handler 
 
 
5. SIMULATION 
We considered in our simulation the Italian provider Vodafone IT having 28.870.000 subscribers 
and 5.538.048 IP addresses registered. Supposing an advertisement having a huge impact e.g., the 
percentage of 0.1% over the whole population clicks the same advertised link then C= 28.870 and 
C/A = 5.21 ⋅  10−3  .  
According to the model presented in Section 4, the click loss ratio is ½ C/A =  2.6 ⋅  10−3 if 
repeated clicks for each IP address are never accounted i.e. it is less than 0.26 %.  
A simulation has been carried out to confirm the model.  
The simulation programs:  
● distributes N users randomly over the all IP address  
● selects randomly N/1000 users who clicks the advertised link  
● Counts how many clicks have been originated by each IP address 
click_handler (click) { 
 NET = lookup_net_by_ip(click.source); // from whois DB 
 A = lookup_net_size(NET); // smallest whois DB net range 
delete from status_table where time < click.time - T; //removes oldest history 
C = select count(*) from status_table where dest = click.dest and net = NET; // 
calculates C 
 if (select count(*) from status_table  where dest = click.dest and source = 
click.source > 0) 
{ // if more than one click from that source. 
 if (0.5 * C / A < threshold )  { 
discard(click); 
return; 
} 
} 
increment_counter (click.dest); // click is accounted for invoicing   
 insert (click.source, click.dest, NET, click.time) into status_table; 
} 
 
● Yields the number of IP addresses that originated 2 or more clicks divided by the total 
number of addresses  
The simulation has executed 100.000 times and yielded the average value of 2.5368 × 10−3. 
The difference between model and simulation is: 
|2.6065 × 10−3 − 2.5368 × 10−3|  = 6.9652 × 10−5 
As a result, the impact of the loss is very low, even in case in which the number of clicks C is 
very high, and the discrepancy between the model and the simulation is negligible. The cost of 
the protection in the Vodafone IT scenario would correspond to less than 0.26% discount in click 
accounting.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The tradeoff protection model presented in this paper allows the AdP precisely assigning a part 
of investment as an insurance to protect the customers from a very simple attack. The threshold 
used in the algorithm exactly corresponds to the percentage of turnover loss that can be decided 
by the AdP. Accepting this loss, the AdP protects the customer from click spam coming from a 
single IP address.  
 
This model is particularly suitable for the large mass of small AdS who receive a few clicks per 
day for which a single repeated attack completely vanishes their investments. In that case, the 
customer should be asked to buy an insurance fee increasing the click fee by e.g., 0,5% to 3% of 
the click price to get the protection against this attack or the AdP can offer this feature as a quality 
of service parameter. 
 
The time interval T should be large enough to collect enough statistics on C, and small enough to 
keep the memory of the clicks not too large to count the accesses of the same users who click 
again the same resource after long time. 
 
This aspect is the key of evolution of the presented algorithm, as the standard deviation of the 
repeated clicks will be also considered to calculate the loss more precisely, possibly postponing 
the calculation when the mean is considered enough significant.  
 
7. APPENDIX 
Being   
𝑁(𝐴, 𝐶)  = ∑(𝑐 − 1) ⋅  
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𝑐!
𝐶
𝑐=2
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𝐶
𝐴
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𝑁(𝜆) = ∑(𝑐 − 1) 
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𝐶
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that can split into two the following parts:  
𝑁(𝜆) = ∑ 𝑐 
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The first part is  
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= 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑒−𝜆 
 
because ∑ 𝑐 
𝜆𝑐𝑒−𝜆 
𝑐!
𝐶
𝑐=0    corresponds by definition to the Poisson mean, i.e.,  𝜆. 
 
The second part  
 
∑
𝜆𝑐𝑒−𝜆 
𝑐!
𝐶
𝑐=2  = ∑
𝜆𝑐𝑒−𝜆 
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𝐶
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Because ∑
𝜆𝑐𝑒−𝜆 
𝑐!
𝐶
𝑐=0  = 1  as it is the sum of the whole Poisson distribution. 
 
Re-composing the two parts, we obtain  
 
𝑁(𝜆) = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑒−𝜆 − 1 + (𝑒−𝜆  + 𝜆 𝑒−𝜆)  = 
= 𝜆 + 𝑒−𝜆 − 1 
 
Expanding N(𝜆) the Taylor’s series of 𝑁(𝜆) up to the second order around 𝜆 = 0 , we obtain: 
𝑁(𝜆) =  𝑁(0) + 𝑁′(0)(𝜆 − 0)  +
𝑁′′(0)(𝜆 − 0)2
2!
+ 𝑅3(𝜆)  
= (1 − 1)  + (1 − 1)𝜆 +
1
2
𝜆2 + 𝑅3(𝜆) = 
=
1
2
𝜆2 + 𝑅3(𝜆) 
Lagrange theorem states that there exists 𝜉 ∈ (0, 𝜆) such that 𝑅3(𝜆) = −
1
6
𝑒−𝜉𝜆3 , as a consequence, 
being 𝜆 > 0 , necessarily 𝑅3(𝜆)< 0 and the following upper bound holds:  
𝑁(𝜆)  =
1
2
(𝜆)2 +  𝑅3(𝜆)  <
1
2
(𝜆)2 
Rewriting 𝜆 as C/A we obtain: 
𝑁(𝐶/𝐴)  =
1
2
(𝐶/𝐴)2 +  𝑅3(𝐶/𝐴)  <
1
2
(𝐶/𝐴)2 
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